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Much contemporary ethical and political cliscou rse involves notion s of the self, its community,
a nd the "othe r" individuals and communities from
whom it distinguishes itself and its own. 'I'he notions of civility and incivility often play a crucial
role here, since one prevalent human approach to
difference has aimed either to include others ethically through their assimilation into a community
or "civilization" of sameness, or to exclude others
by designating them as beastly, savage, or "uncivilized." This dynamic has operated in abundant
well-documented inter-human relationships. This
paper argues that the same dynamic structures
much Western human-non-human animal theoretical discourse, and that much of what has been said
about inter-human collective political activity and
its ethical implications can and should be applied
to questions regarding the ethical relationships between the community of human beings and its
non-human animal others, especially in light of certain postmodern conditions. Indeed, in some ways,
much contemporary political and ethical theory
that explicitly addresses only inter-human relationships is even more applicatory to the encounter between humans a nd non-human animals than it is to
the relationship regarding which it was originally
conceived.
Paradox pervades the relationship between civility and animality. Often, purportedly civilized
human beings contrast themselves from " beastly"
or "savage" non-human animals, then justify treating these "uncivilized" animals with barbaric brutality o n grounds that only the civilized deserve to
be treated with civility. .. uch thinking obviously
violates the spirit of the moral demands implied in
the connotations of "civility" that involve humaneness, gentleness, and kindness.1 l will attempt to un-
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dermine this dynamic by building upon the current discourse on human collective
political activity, human-non-human animal social relations, and thoughts of
"postmodern" or "post-structuralist" thinkers Martin I Ieidcggcr, Emmanuel
Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.
Before launching into a discussion of the interspecies relationship, it may be
helpful to examine relevant concepts as they appear in current discourse on interhuman political encounters, for a recent trend here reconceptualizcs the relationship between the community and its others in ways eminently applicable to the
interspecies encounter. The two thinkers examined in this section describe a dichotomizing move in traditional political discourse that they consider problematic
and for which they seek an alternative middle ground. Though the authors' two
projects do not precisely mirror each other, this paper indicates that the same general structure that they see at work in the inter-human political realm also functions in the human-non-human animal encounter. After examining the
middle-ground position these auth ors advocate and incorporating ideas from
Heidegger, Lcvinas, and Derrida, this study will endorse a similar middle-ground
conclusion about the relationship between the human community and other animals.

Civility, Ethics, and Animality in Contemporary Political Discourse
Regarding human collective political activity, Martin I.!.. Marty portrays a destructive dichotomy between "totalism" and "tribalism" that he secs operating in
the political milieu of the United States. As Marty describes the situation, the
totalists, usually linked with nationalists, strive to suppress difference by enforcing
a single ideology on each individual in the community. Totalists acknowledge the
existence of dissenters from the communitarian creed, but they seek to nullify the
difference that these marginalized voices embody by assimilating them within the
pre-existing communal narrative. On the other hand, Marty describes triba)jsm as
the view that the community at large cannot provide a coherent ideology-that
only the smaller, particularized social groups to which one belongs can accomplish
this (10-14). Marty secs a type of tribalist orientation operating in, among others,
the work of Alasdair Mcintyre, who proclaims the existence of "incommensurable universes of discourse," in which the subjective contexts within which any
individual or group is inscribed preclude meaningful contact or mutual understanding (71-2). Regarding such an orientation (and demonstrating a humanistic
limitation that this paper aims to address) Marty quotes Reinhold Niehbur's statement, "lTJhe chief source of man's [sic] inhumanity to man seems to be the tribal
limits of his sense of obligation to the other man" (12).
According to Marty, the totalist and tribalist tendencies have wrought trauma
in American life, and he avoids what he secs as an unnecessary dichotomy between assimilation and incommensurability with the concept of "symbiosis,"
which indicates for Marty "social life" or " living together." The idea is that while
particular contextualized group differences can and should exist, the possibility
also exists for the mutual enrichment of each group through their contact (147149). To resolve the tensions between those who seek to preserve or extend
sameness and those who would protect their own group-based identity from con-
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tac~ ~ith ~the:ncss, Marty emphasizes the importance of the concept of story in

political life. 1 he working "symbiotc" he envisions can be achievcd--and incommcnsurability transcended--only when marginalized groups are able to assemble
an? give voic~ to their plight and when the dominant group truly listens to this
voice. I Tc wntes that Native Americans, Jews, and descendants of slaves must
~peak up and tell their own story in order to, among other things, preserve their
important cultural uniqueness (146).
Iris Young likewise secs a debilitating dichotomy framing much of traditional
political theory. The dichotomy Marty describes between tribalism and totalism
~irrors. the ~ontrast Young tlescribcs in traditional political theory between individual libernlism anti communitarianism. For Young, individual liberalism fails to
a.ccommotlate the political significance of diffcrentfatetl cultural group identification, anti thus burkes an important form of group sameness, while
c~mmunitarian.ism suppresses difference, by imposing one view on the many (j11slm 226-236). Like Marty, Young intends to chart a course that avoids the dilemma
she dc~cribcs, encouraging the emphasis on group differences and refusing the assum~tio~ that a theorist might obtain a comprehensive and detemporalizcd point
of view independent of the social context in which issues of justice arise (j11slice 34). Like Marty, who declares the totalist efforts to achieve a practically homogenous state to be dangerous if unchecked (11 -12), Young argues that we must not
be deluded by a notion of an ideal homogenous community of shared subjectivity, for such an ideal assumes a problematic logic of identity, squelching difference, and she declares that political relations must affirm the group differences
that they currently seek to exclude or assimilate (j11slice 232-236).
. Notwithstanding work attempting to teach apes to use human-derived symbolic languages (these will be discussed below), non-human animals are
ontologically unable to tell us their story in a way that any marginalized human
group could. Thus the ethical imperative of extending to them considerations of
~'civility" as "kindness" and "humaneness" goes unrecognized by so many. This
includes Marty, whose discussion is limi ted to the extension of civility without assimilation only to affiliations based on uniquely human identity descriptors, e.g.,
race, sex, class, ethnicity, nationality, and language (20). Non-human animals as a
marginalized group arc conspicuously absent from the list of those whose stories
he wishes to include in the general discourse. The same is true of Young's analysis,
whose valuable attention to approaching the question by listening to the oppressed (j11Slice 3-14 and I11c/11sio11 ch. 5), unfortunately, is limited to consideration
of oppression with inter-human origins, e.g., "racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and ableism" (j11slice 11). The humanistic limitation in Young's work is further
evidenced in her exaltation of city life as the ideal (and inevitable) mode of human existence (j11stice 237). Cities arc generally thought of as places where large
numbers of people live, not as homes for non-human animals. 2 One might regard
Young's ideali%ation here as an example of the pathological positivism-the accepting as given of that which requires supplementation-that she elsewhere decries (j11slice 3). Young's ideal of the city as the place where (human) strangers arc
brought together can be fruitfully supplemented with the valorizations of wilderness exhibited by thinkers such as Max Oelschlaeger, Akira Lippit, William
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Cronon, and Ted Benton. In the city, admittedly different, contextualized groups
do come together as strangers, but they do so in light of at least the possibility of
some linguistic connection that is structurally impossible with other species, who
remain in this sense ever stranger to us than any linguistically capable human.
Some of these authors' ideas, however, arc more useful for understanding
interspecies relations than is Young's rosy vision of the city. For example, Marty's
discussion of story, when recontextualized, seems eminently apposite to the human-non-human animal encounter. Ile endorses an openness that preserves difference rather than assimilating or excluding it; this openness must acknowledge
that another being's story may be uttered in an unfamiliar language-or may be
undetectable at all. Such a perspective may be required in the encounter between
different humans, most of whom have the communicative power of speech and
writing-it is even more crucial for an appropriate understanding of the relationship between humans and other animals, whose different subjectivity entails different modes of communication.
Young's political analysis echoes themes from Marty's discourse on stories, especially those issuing from marginalized groups, when she heralds the importance
of the "self-organization of marginalized people into affinity groupings lthatl enable people to develop a language in which to voice experiences" (I11c/11.rio11 155).
This is exactly the type of complex self-organization and linguistic development
and expression that are impossible for other species; thus it is inappropriate to apply the linguistic standard to questions regarding the ethical status of non-human
animals. Among humans, some admittedly unstable but still significant political
and ethical discourse is possible, because humans can give linguistic expression to
their subjectivity and arc able to comprehend similar expressions by other humans. Between human and other animal species, on the other hand, this link is absent, and this relationship requires an ethics grounded in a notion of civility as the
gentle treatment of a partially inaccessible other. For this reason, Young's formulation of "a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another," when
recontextualizcd along the same lines as indicated above regarding Marty's discussion of story, facilitates the deployment of a more fitting ethical model for the
interspecies relationship (jrfstice 234). If a non-human animal's story is to be told
or heard, this will require both a different type of listening than that to which humans are accustomed, as well as an attempt (the success of which is assumed from
the start to be circumscribed) to tell the story of non-humans' ethical importance
in our own language.
Marty and Young both inquire about the general question of the civil relationship between the community and its others. Both authors seek a middle course
that affirms group difference and that promotes contact without assimilation and
meaningful exchange without complete subjective harmony, in contrast to traditional ethical theory, which has assumed that what is essential is to break down the
barrier between beings for direct ethical exchange to occur- that the other must
prove to be somehow like me. But both depend on some level of commensurability in language, which is structurally impossible within the human-non-human animal relationship, so I now turn to recent work, performed across a range of
disciplines, which explicitly investigates the nature of this encounter.

Within the current interdisciplinary discourse on the human-non-human animal relationship, a dichotomy of approaches seems to have emerged. One approach exclusively emphasizes (at least some species oQ non-human animals'
sameness, in some important regard, vis-a-vis humanity; the other focuses exclusively on non-human animals' otherness or difference from humanity in one or
more crucial respects. The central questions in the two main works this paper will
contrast to illustrate this dichotomy arc those that ground the rest of this paperquestions about human and non-human animal ontology and about the ethical relationship between the civilized human community and the beastly animal others.
The Great Ape Project, edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, typifies the
first half of the dichotomy. Fundamental to this project is the assumption that for
any other person or animal to demand direct ethical consideration, some aspect of
similnrity among the individuals involved is required, and its proponents go to
great lengths to highlight ways in which animals arc similar to humans-genetically, physiologically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially. incc, the thesis
claims, our "fellow great apes" (chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) exhibit
such similnrities, they should be included in the sphere of moral equality. As a representative of the approach that overemphasizes sameness while neglecting the
fruitful possibilities that difference can generate, the "Declaration on Great Apes"
explicitly inculpates "ltlhe notion of 'us' as opposed to 'the other,' in the enabling
of centuries of tribalism, nationalism, racism, and 'spccicsism"' (5).
The second half of the work explores successes in communicating with apes
via various means of symbolic systems derived by humans, in which animals do
seem to exhibit similarity with human beings in their admittedly limited but meaningful attachment of such symbols to physical objects, feelings, and people.
Dawkins presents an arresting image of a computer-generated hypothetical "intermediate" human/chimpanzee face, evoking the theme of the continuity of
species boundaries that runs throughout the book (86). Corbcy's contribution,
"The Philosopher's Ape," argues for the existence of relative and gradual differences between humans and other great apes as opposed to purported essential
and absolute differences highlighted "among philosophers" (133). In the appropriately titled contribution, "Who's Like Us?" rIayrc and I Tayrc propose the extension of the "community of equals"- a concept already criticized by Marty and
Young for its failure to note significant differences between members of the human community-and which this paper examines through a different philosophical lens than the one Corbey challenges (175).
In a work as vast as this collection, there arc exceptions to the near-exclusive
emphasis on sa meness. For example, Mitchell (244) and Francione (256) admit the
existence of the ontological difference between humans and other animals, to
avoid the absurdity (often employed as a critique of "animal rights" positions) of
requiring human interference with wildlife by policing the animal world to prevent
violence. Particularly germane to this paper is Corbey's contribution, which portrays civility as the restraint of "animal" impulses and observes, " fAlnimals by
their very nature act in uncivilized ways" (128). Tlcre Corbey touches upon the
major point that must be faced by anyone who wants to extend to non-human ani-
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mals the kind of direct ethical consideration that is normally reserved for humans
alone: this entails an asymmetrical and non-reciprocity based ethical structure, the
deployment of which is facilitated by incorporating ideas from the writings of
Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, as I will elaborate below.
Jamieson also stumbles into this realm of transition from traditional philosophical conceptualizations of animal being and its relationship to human being
to the transformed conceptualization that I advocate when he writes, "Perhaps
some day we will reach a stage in which the similarities among the grc..-at apes will
be salient for us, and the differences among them will be dismissed as trivial and
unimportant, or perhaps evt11 e11richi11g [emphasis mine!" (225). The goal that dominates The Great Ape Project is summarized by the first two possibilities- that humans will recognize ethically significant similarities and that the differences
between human and other ape species will be dismissed as trivial. I would like to
emphasize the third possibility-that these differences may be psychologically, sociologically, philosophically, and ethically enriching-and to argue that both traditional "modern" and much "postmodern" philosophical discourse has failed
adequately to view through such a lens the region where the concepts of civility
and animality intersect.
In contrast with the sameness oriented Great Ape Project, Paul Shepard's engaging and lyrical The Others: How A11imol.s Mode Us I ill1no11 emphasizes (or overemphasizes) the difference between human and non-human animal species, and
thus his work serves as an effective foil to the predominant tack that exclusively
accentuate sameness and community. For Shepard, the primary relationship between human beings and the non-human animal Other is established through human predation; indeed, for Shepard, omnivory is essential to what it means to be
human; he declares that the human mind is "child of the hunt"-that the hunt
"made us human" (17, 9). Ile couples this evolutionary story with a spiritual one
in which humans' killing and eating of non-human animals effects a simultaneously physical and metaphysical transformation, which Shepard describes as
"the ultimate act of respect," for it is "consummation as an act of unity with the
Other [which] was the inspired legacy of omnivory" (12, 27). Ifc explicitly rejects
the importance of civility as kindness when, describing his encounter with the
"great naturalists;' he states that it was 11ot their "civilized kindness" that he valued
but their "curiosity, receptive courtesy, gratitude and respect for the power of animals" (5). Shepard avoids anthropocentrism by speculating that for the non-human animal, death in the hunt may be painless or euphoric (29), and that for
humans the killing and consumption of the non-human animal, infused by the
power of our thankfulness (35), bestows upon us the radical and sacred gift of the
animal of itself as meat (333). '1'his paper advocates reversing the structure-offering non-human animals the radical gift (sec the discussion of Derrida below)
of direct ethical consideration, which assumes no symmetry or reciprocity.
Like thinkers such as Peter Singer, Shepard exhibits revulsion for factory
farms, but, unlike Singer, he grounds this sentiment in an explicitly personal and
spiritual communion with the other animals one rightfully consumes. Furthermore, Shepard consistently valorizes the flipside of this personal rclationshipthe "gut-wrenching' possibility of being eaten-though it is difficult to envision
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t~is as the same type of possibility for (post)modern humanity as it was for our

distant ancestors, whose existence Shepard desires to emulate. With the technological capacity to feed humans on a meat-free diet, it is far from clear that human
predation upon other animals is either necessary or desirable. Shepard's work is
inspiring for its insight into the mystery of non-human animal being and the fasci~,a~on it evokes'. but it is t~o fascinated with the institution of omnivory itsel£
I his can be partially remedied by an ethics of civility as kindness and as contact
without assimilation.
Where the project of this paper is concerned, Shepard's exaltation of
omnivory is guilty of what Young termed bad " positivism," which assumes as
given what should be critiqued- here the assimilatory structure of the humannon-human animal relationship: of omnivory. Shepard over-emphasizes non-human animals' otherness and substitutes a particular humanistic vision of human
versus animal ontology, without acknowledging the other types of meaningful
connections that arc possible between human and non-human animal species, beyond that of predator and prey, which he so eloquently describes. Shepard views
the animal world as a text to be read, approaching Marty>s and Young's emphasis
on story, but encloses his analysis in one omnivorous rendering of the text, rarely
considering possible non-human animal productions or "readings" of their own
"texts." Regarding Shepard's analysis of the human story about non-human animality, though he attempts to subvert the oft-cited Western tendency to disguise
the animal's living form behind its presentation as food, via semantic shifts-e.g.,
from " flc..,h"
· t'' or f rom " tortured caIf" to " vca l" - h'1s emp has1s
· on non. ., to " mca
human animals' " otherness" enables the unreasonable glorification of the spiritual
experience of human predation. Such thinking must be supplanted; where
Shepard advocates that humans speak thanks for the generative kill, I promote an
ethics of listening for the perhaps ungrateful but still compelling call of the animal via unfamiliar idioms.
Some authors arc already taking tentative steps in this direction. ror example,
recently published collections in the field of geography also recognize in broad
terms the types of dichotomies this paper analyzes and thus deserve mention
here. Philo advocates the explicit political project that takes animals seriously as
another social group and focuses on their transgressive symbolic power (52-3).
I~mcl writes of animals as "symbols of resistance" (112-113). Michel writes of the
care for wildlife as a political act of resistance (176), and Lynn describes speaking
for the moral value of animals as "transgressing the boundaries of our humancentered morality" (286). Philo and Wilbert most closely approach this paper's focus on the nexus of civility and animality in another collection of geographical
writings when they speak of constructi ng a "new animal geography" in which animals receive our extended "courtesies" (25). 1n the same volume, Jones emphasizes the uneven ethical relationships between humans and other animal species,
even hesitantly advocating the "adaptation" of Levinasian themes, again approaching the discussion that will dominate some of the remaining sections of
this paper, which plumb Levinasian themes more deeply than does Jones's brief
treatment, while supplementing these themes with the thoughts of Heidegger and
Derrida.
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A discussion of postmodern thinkers docs well to begin by examining the
views of the modern thinkers whose views they undermine or transcend. In the
history of human treatment of non-human animals, two trends have dominated,
each with a source in one of two main Western ethical theories, deontological and
utilitarian. Paradigmatic exemplars of each camp, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy
Bentham, explicitly addressed the subject in a way that reflects the dichotomous
thinking discussed throughout this paper.
Kant clearly states that non-human animals, as "non-rational," have mere "indirect" ethical relevance. Only " rational" human beings can legislate or embody
the pure moral law and thus qualify as ends-in-themselves, while non-self-conscious, non-rational animals can exist only as means to human ends. Of course,
Kant's banishment of animals from the realm of directly relevant beings docs not
necessarily imply the acceptability of, nor docs Kant condone, human cruelty toward animals. However, Kant bases his condemnation of animal cruelty on the
grounds that a human who indulges in animal cruelty will be more likely also to
cause gratuitous harm to other human beings. Thus, according to Kant, humans
have an "indirect'' duty "regarding" animals that prohibits wanton cruelty toward
them, but this is so only because humans have other "direct'' duties towards each
other as fcUow rational ends-in-themselves (LectNres 239-40).
This structure has determined the lives of bmions of animals, and though
Kant did not condone human cruelty toward animals, his intellectual legacy includes the notorious Cartesian vivisectionists, who argued that non-human animals were incapable of suffering pain, and thinkers such as Jan Narvcson, who
while not denying the existence of non-human animal pain, argues that the quality
and therefore the ethical relevance of the suffering of beings with sophisticated
mental capacities is different from the suffering of lower animals with less complicated inner lives. While this might seem to bolster a position according to which

mammals should be treated humanely while insects may be killed, Narveson
draws the dividing line higher up the phylogenic scale, and rather than attempt to
deny animal pain as Shepard does, he rejects its relevance to human beings (37).
Such a basically Kantian perspective characterizes prevalent Western attitudes regarding human treatment of non-human animals. Laws exist, too, that proscribe
non-institutionalized animal cruelty, but institutionalized animal cruelty for human benefit is countenanced--cvcn for minor benefits such as the satisfaction of
culinary tastes. While people might argue about which animals are ethically edible
and which experiments arc morally permissible, most people affirm that to satisfy
hunger or to expand scientific knowledge, considerable animal suffering is allowed, even if regretted.
Kant's contcmpc>rary and paradigmatic utilitarian Jeremy Bentham advanced a
view regarding non-human animals that has persistently dogged the Kantian perspective. Bentham's utilitarian approach is theoretically simple: ethical decisions
require that one calculate the interests of all involved and choose the course of
action that will maximize the benefit among this group. Some standard problems
with utilitarian thinking arc well known, e.g., the tenuous nature of inter-subjective value calculations and the ways that strict utilitarianism allows intolerable
harms to individuals or minorities provided sufficient benefit to the majority
(f Tarwood 179-192, Mel ntyre 236-243). Another major source of criticism is
Bentham's unitary notion of pleasure as the sole good. According to Bentham's
formulation, opponents claimed, one must conclude that given the choice between "satisfied fool,, and "unsatisfied Socrates," or between "satisfied pig,, and
"unsatisfied human,,, the former states would be preferable. Indeed, Bentham is
famous for the following statement regarding non-human animals: "The question
is not, 'Can they renso11?' nor, 'Can they talk?' but 'Can they S11ffeit"' (307). This
valuation of non-human animal being fueled critique of Bentham's emphasis on
pleasure and earned his Ifedonistic Calculus the moniker of "swine-philosophy."
It also highlights the major weakness of the last two hundred years of utilitarian
thought on this topic, from Bentham to Peter Singer: inadequate treatment of the
differcncc(s) between humans and other animals.
For example, inadequate consideration of this difference prompts some to
proclaim the existence of "animal rights." While I support the motivating position
that people should respect the lives of other animals more than many people currently do, I believe that the compulsion to advocate animal rights results from a
failure to consider fully the ontological diffcrcncc(s) between human and animal
being-from an ethics of the same, which assu mes that ethical relationships are
necessarily and essentially contractual and/or symmetrical. Do dogs have the right
to vote? As l feiclegger writes in a different context, "Such judgment may be compared to the procedure of trying to evaluate the essence and powers of a fish by
seeing how long it can live on dry land" ("I fumanism" 265).
Kant and Bentham both contribute to the ethical approach this paper will
chart, but where Bentham underemphasizcs the difference between human and
animal being, Kant overemphasizes it. In a sense, Kant has the form right and the
content wrong, while Bentham has the form wrong and the content right.
Bentham is right to extend direct ethical consideration to non-human animals; he
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All these thinkers have already stepped into postmodern philosophical territory by seeking alternative possibilities to present themselves where other animals
are concerned and by encouraging the construction of "new geographies" like
Haraway's "cyborg world," in which humans avoid relationships of hierarchical
domination or "hyperpolarization," reflected in the dichotomies discussed
throughout this paper, and instead affirm their joint kinship with beings from
contradictory standpoints (154). These authors already recognize the implications
of the postmodern condition vis-a-vis the human-non-human animal relationship,
and their analyses of the dichotomies between modernity and postmodcrnity provide the transition to a reoriented view of the philosophical history of the humananimal dichotomy and of the implications for this dichotomy of the new
environment these writers describe. Deploying transformed ideas from the writings of Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida into this debate will add to these conceptual anabases, helping to chart a middle course between the sameness oriented
Great Ape Project and the otherness rooted analysis Shepard provides--a course in
which civility and animality supplement each other through meaningful contact
without assimilation.
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is wrong to believe that the detached, mathematical calculation of interests and
consequences is equal to the task of ethical thinking or that a concept of non-human animals' sameness vis-a-vis humanity provides the only necessary buttress for
an argument that encourages the direct consideration of their interests. Kant is
wrong to deny non-human animals such direct consideration, but he is right to
recognize that human rationality and the difference between human and non-human animal beings are crucial factors in this particular ethical relationship, and he
is right to seek a transcendent, radical ground for ethics rather than relying solely
on empirical calculation, which is always tenuous and provisional. The
postmodern break with the modern ethics of utility or cleontology, fuclecl in part
by the thoughts of Heidegger, Lcvinas, ancl Dcrricla, proviclcs the basis for a new
approach to questions regarding the ethical status of non-human animals--one
that transcends the difficulties involved with both traclitional formulations of the
1SSUC.

The Post-Modern Alternative
This paper presents a possible middle ground between, on one hand, the ascendant humanist view, which recognizes only non-human animals' otherness and
defines them essentially as mere raw material for the satisfaction of human needs
or desires and, on the other hand, the extreme sort of naturalism that can grow
from a myopic focus on non-human animals, (or "nature's") sameness, vis-a-vis
humanity. It attempts to accomplish this by recogni:t.ing the proper contributions
and limitations of each of these formulation s of non-human animal beings and
by supplementing them with ideas from an ethics of deconstruction, inspired by
the writings of Martin l Ieidegger, Emmanuel Levin as, and Jacques Derrida.
Each member of this trio challenges aspects of the Cartesian foundationalism
that grounds modernist approaches to ethics such as Kant's Categorical Jmperative and Bentham's Hedonistic Calculus. 'The approaches of Kant and Bentham
assume that rational deliberations by an objective, isolated, and de-historicized
subject produce unquestionable ethical guidelines. Poststructuralist thinkers, on
the other hand, have challenged the unquestionable validity of the rules thus produced, the discrete and objective self that produced them, and the assumecl
knowledge regarding those to whom the rules apply. I suggest an alternative formulation that offers the possibility of allowing the non-human animal to present
its ethical demands before its submission to the rules or methods of calculation to
which humans normally submit the other and its interests. The traditional approach assumes that before one can address questions regarding non-human animals' ethical status, one must first define the essence of animals' beings. Kant and
Bentham both begin their ethical deliberations regarding animals in thi s way, and
their definitions of an animal's essence as either sentient or non-rational risk committing the sort of ontological imperialism that produces an "ethics of the same"
(sec the discussion of Levinas's critique below). What 1 am calling for here is an
acknowledgement from the beginning of ethical deliberation that the other animal
always outstrips my knowledge, and that the true ethical relationship between
"civilized" humans and " uncivilized,, non-human animals is indeed founded in
this radical difference and lack of comprehension.

178

~ile one of my goals is to pr~mote an evolution in consciousness regarding
the e~hical status of no~-human anunals and the prevention of needless suffering,
working through these issues surrounding non-human animals' ethical status can
serve humanity as well, advancing understanding of the nature of inter-human
ethics.. •or example, one who attempts inter-human application of notions from
the eth~cs of .clcconstruction, such as "absolute alterity" or "radical hospitality,"
faces clifficulties that do not plague one who applies these concepts to the enco~ntcr ?ct:wccn hu.mans and other animals, where structural asymmetry and nonreciprocity arc obvious and inescapable. Contracts arc impossible in this latter
cncou~tcr, ?~t they ~re ~ftcn indispensable in human interaction. The economy
of racl1cal gtving can inspire our goocl will toward fellow humans, but, for reasons
that If obbes expatiated in the seventeenth century, before full elaboration of either the traditional clcontological/utilitarian polarity or the postmodern alternative, it woulcl be impractical to expect the economy of radical giving to dominate
our courts, marketplace, international relations, etc. This paper advances ethical
dialogue by shcclcling new light on the possible contributions and limitations of an
i~t:r-human ethics grounded in ideas of asymmetry or radical alterity, by rccogn1:t.ing the asymmetrical "ethics of deconstruction" (sec the work of Simon
Critchley for a full exposition of the meaning of this phrase) at work in the human-animal encounter and by analyzing the relationship between the inter-human
encounter and that between humans and other animals.
This work will also hold important significance for the specialized field of environmental ethics, where the question of non-human animals' ethical status is
usually treated. Much work in this area has roots in the "land ethic" of thinkers
such as Ale.lo l ,eopolcl or, more recently, by the "deep ecology" of thinkers such as
Arne Nacss. While these approaches do represent a conceptual evolvement vis-avis the delimitations of the human-animal relationship that Ka nt and Bentham inspire, their relationship with these latter thinkers is "eschatological" in the same
sense as arc the thoughts of I Icidegger and Levinas vis-a-vis the deontological
and utilitarian ethical approaches generally, in that they sometimes seem to advoc~te escapi ng human subjectivity or denying ontological difference between species, or between humanity and " nature" in general. This maneuver degrades
humanity and fails to recogni:t.c important responsibilities entailed by humanity's
unique position in the ecosphere; it also degrades animality by not recognizing
something noted by thinkers from Buddha to Bentham to Peter inger and Tom
Regan: that sentience matters -that, generally speaking, biological creatures capable of suffering deserve more direct ethical consideration than do inanimate
and insentient things. This is not to deny the huge indirect or instrumental ethical
relevance of entities such as plants, soils, bodies of water, or ecosystems, but to
recognize the bounds of both human and non-human subjectivity, as well as the
responsib ilities entailed by the special powers humans exercise as they relate to
other animals and to nature at large.

Heidegger and Animal Being
Of the several places in which [ Icidegger analyzes the being of non-human
an imals, the most extensive is a section of The F1111do11Je11tal Co11cepts of Metopl.!Jsics:
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World, Finit11de Solitlfde, where be describes non-human animal being as "poor-inworld." While non-human animal being is subjective and not "worldless" like the
being of the stone, the non-human animal is capable of only a limited range and
depth of experiential relationships-unlike human Dascin, who is the only being
constitutionally able to relate to anything "as such." According to I Ieideggcr's description, non-human animals "have" a world, but they arc "benumbed" or "bedazzled" by it and are unable to recognize this or anything else "as such." I le
contrasts this relative shallowness of non-human animal experience with the richness of "world-forming" human Dascin. Elsewhere, along similar lines,
Heidegger discusses the "abyss of essence'' that separates the human who can
think, speak, and "have hands" (as opposed to mere grasping organs) from the
ape that cannot ("Thinking"). While I Icidegger denies that his ontological discourse regarding non-human animality implies any corresponding ethical determination, his consideration of the ontological difference between the being of
humans and that of other animals, like Kant's less extensive reflections, facilitates
responding to thinkers who inappropriately apply conventional inter-human systems of contractual, symmetrical, "ethics of the same" to the relationship between humans and other animals, which is structurally non-contractual,
asymmetrical, and rooted in ontological difference.
This emphasis on the ontological difference between humans and other animals is one part of Heidegger's contribution to my project; a second is his call to
an essentially phenomenological mode of thinking that docs not immediately assault being with the demands of the ratio but attempts to open a clearing for being
to emerge "without reason," as he discusses at length in The Pri11dple of &oso11.
Heidegger also discusses different modes of human being-of Being coming to
presence through humans in different ways-by writing of thinking as poitJis,
prior to its co-optation in the service of theoria and tech11e ("1 I umanism" 218-221 ).
Such a position suggests that humans (and "humanism") fail to recognize such
possible modes of aletheia when they assume that ratio marks the essence of humanity and depend exclusively on this mode of encountering the world. 3
Heidegger refutes the idea, central to the metanarrative of Kant and Bentham,
that humanity is exhaustively or essentially defined as the animal rationale, linking
such a notion with that of humanity as a11i111al llletapf?ysicmn, and arguing that metaphysics is overcome in the mode of thinking he valorizes. This has ramifications
for Kantian and utilitarian formulations of ethics in general and for the dominant
approaches to the question of non-human animals' ethical status in particular that
Kant and Bentham inspire, for these orientations arc products of the a11imale rationale-Kant and Bentham both legislate moral law according to Jaws set by the ratio
of the "animal metaphysic1111/' that Heidegger undermines.
The animal rationale might be "the lord of beings," but I Jcidegger prefers a
conception of humanity as "the shepherd of Being I· .. whol gains the essential
poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself
into the preservation of Being's truth" ("J f umanism" 245). Where elsewhere
Heidegger had defined non-human animals being with the image of "poverty,"
here he speaks of the poverty of human Dascin, who is powerless in the face of
the call of responsibility entailed by humanity's being thrown into its role as " pre-
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server of Being's truth"-cven though it is humans' particular "powers" that allow them to hear this call in the first place. According to I Ieidegger, fundamental
"Ek-sistencc, [... J ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being [...] is the guardianship, that is, the care for Being" (246). Heidegger's contribution to my project includes the exploration of possible modes of existence other than those that
"assault" or "en frame" being ("Technology" 311-341 )-particularly non-human
animal modes of being-and the introduction of a concept of stewardship that,
when applied to the relationship between humans and other animals, acknowledges the importance of ontological differences between humans and other animals and recognizes the responsibility that this difference entails for those of us
who m11 relate to things "as such" and who do have hands that "form worlds"in~luc.Jing those worlds of which other animal species arc either inhabitants or
pnsoncrs.
The implications of all this for questions of animal ethics should be obvious
by this point, though I Jcidegger docs not explicitly thematize them. rirst,
If eidegger's approach stands in direct contrast with the " modern" approaches
represented by and issuing from Kant and Bentham, who assume as given the existence of the discrete subject as calculator of value and legislator of moral law.
l nsteac.J, If eidegger c.Jiscusses a more "originary ethics" than any "humanistic" or
"metaphysical" version, with roots in what he calls a primordial ethos. I Ieidegger
describes a structure in which ethical demands issue not from the reasoning and
calculative metaphysical subject but from Being itself, and humanity's task is to respond appropriately. When over-reaching metaphysical tendencies are sufficiently
checked, the possibility for a new "path of thinking" emerges-a path that presents itself in stark contrast to the style of calculative thought that demands or
renders reasons (Pri11dple 26-7) or that "enframcs" everything as "standing reserve" for technological utilization ("Technology" 311-341). This new path is
marked by gelosse11heit- a "rclcasement'' toward things that lets beings be, without
assaulting them with the subjective assertions of a humanistic metaphysics.
While humanity's uniquely "ontological" nature gives it partial power to form
its own world, the products of human reason also largely determine the content
of any world that non-human animals have. The "guardianship" of which
1Icidcgger speaks resonates with an ethics founded in an asymmetrical power
structure. As the only animal which, according to I Tcideggcr, can have hands and
form worlds, humanity has the power on one hand to force the animal being to
render itself as standing reserve in a factory farm (not to mention the power to
eliminate other animal species altogether), or, on the other hand, to structure the
world in a manner that includes areas where other animals have freedom to be
more "authentically."4 If umans can force calves into being the ethically irrelevant
source of veal, or they can allow them the freedom to move, to nurse, to play, etc.
The call of responsibility referred to above can be seen as the natural result of
humanity's unique nature as guardian of Being, and it implies a concept of stewardship regarding non-human animal life which strives to allow certain modes of
animal being to flourish while not forcing into presence torturous and distorted
forms of animal being, such as those that exist on veal farms and in laboratories
for the development of cosmetics.
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To borrow another expression, this one from the essay on technology: for animals, indeed, from whence the danger comes, also comes the saving power. I Iumans have perpetually employed their cognitive powers in strategics of
oppression and violence against other animal species. Some might seek to jettison
rationality completely, but the strategy outlined here involves employing our cognitive powers to realize that rationality is not the ne pl/IS If/Ira of creation, but, to
speak as Heidegger, is but one mode among others of the prcsencing of Bcingthough a particularly dangerous mode in its tendency to shut out other forms. It is
not a matter of renouncing rationality or technology but of not allowing thetie
modes of aletheia to obliterate other valuable modes of being, human and animal.
Similarly, it is not a mater of escaping or relinquishing our role as shepherd, but
of embodying it with humane respect for other animals over whom we have
power-of reaffirming the archaic sense of "civility" as gentle, kind, and lm111a11t.
The major deficit in Heidegger's thought where this project is concerned is
the absence of any explicit ethical conclusions about the human-animal relationship that his extensive ontological reflections regarding human and animal being
might be expected to yield, and this study will benefit by supplementing
Heidegger's contributions with the discourse of Immanuel Lcvinas and Jacques
Derrida.

Levinas's Other and the 'Unreasonable' Uniqueness of
Humanity
Like H eidegger, Immanuel I.-evinas secs his own work as breaking with the
dominant Western orientation, but where f fcidcgger marks that tradition as
bound by Plato and Nietzsche, Lcvinas's landmarks arc Parmcnidcs and
Heidegger. In fact, Levinas secs Heidegger as the paramount represe ntative of an
approach that squelches the Other. It docs this, Lcvinas argues, by shutting the
thinking self off from access to the Other's alterity and thinking of it in such a
way as to force it into categories of the Same. Lcvinas comments on his relationship with Heidegger in numerous places. In one representative example, he states,
"Heidegger's Dascin? Dasein never wonders whether, by being da, ' there', it's taking somebody else's place!" (Frmch Philosophers 19).
Levinas calls his own project "ethics as first philosophy," in contrast with the
"ontological" approach that has hitherto dominated Western thought, rejecting
the self-initiated categorization of the Other (Totaliry 69) and condemning Western philosophy as a process of "ontology [... involving! a reduction of the other
to the same" (Totali!J 43). Like IJeidcggcr, Levinas avoids issuing moral guidelines
in the traditional sense, because, for Lcvinas, the encounter with altcrity is primary,
and this altcrity is radically unknowable. This renders unjustifiable attempts to
subject the Other to any ultimate, rationally derived moral principle such as the
Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Benefit Maximization. Commentators
note this aspect of Levinasian ethics as well, e.g., Llcwclyn reviews of Lcvinas's
idea of the ethical as prior to the ideas of justice that guide dcontological and teleological moralities (137), and Davis distinguishes Levinas's project from those
that employ codes of rules or study reasoning about how we should behave (35).
The fundamental problem plaguing both dominant approaches to non-human
animal ethics is that they assume that their first step in deciding what obligations
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humans have toward other animals must be to provide some positive answer to
th~ question: "What are non-human animals?" Kant and Bentham both proceed
this way, and both make hasty and one-sided presumptions of knowledge about
0th.e r animals' being in ~rdcr to submit these beings to rules established by ratiocinatJon. In contrast, Levinas eschews the questions ''Who is the other?" and ''What
is the other?" and declares that such questions reduce the other to a "character
within a contc.xt," robbing it.of its inherent elusiveness (Nemo 86). If the concept
of the Other 1s enlarged to include members of other animal species, then it becomes clea: that Bentham's assimilation of non-human animals within the sphere
of the sentient and Kant's conscription of the "non-rational" a nimal to the lower
tier o.f m~re in~ir~ct ethical relevance could both be considered guilty of the "ontological imperialism" and suppression of altcrity that Lcvinas means to counter.
No n-human anima li ty's relative powerlessness----cvcn its " poverty in world"can, when viewed through this Lcvinasian lens, reinforce the call to stewardship
developed from I fcidegger's writings.
. l ,ev'.nas a~so dwells extensively on the structural asymmetry of the ethical rcla~1onsh1p; this comes to the fore in his symbolism of the Other as "orphan,
widow, strnnger"- symbols that emphasize the relative powerlessness of the
Other (Totality 76-77, among other places). Levinas illuminates a structure in
';hich ~he forcefulness of the Other's demand for respect varies in inverse proporaon with the Other's level of "power'' in the usual sense of the word. The margi nal figures of the widow, orphan, and stranger arc all somehow deprived (of a
husband, of parents, or of friendly fellows); they lack the power to command
~thical respect by physical force or via a symmetrical contract, but they command
it nonethel ess-a nd for this reason (Othenvise 11, de G reef 507-520). Lcvinas's
Other, paradoxically, occupies a position of power relative to the self and calls the
freedom of the self into question (Totali!J 84). Once this necessary structural
asymmetry of the ethical relationship that Lcvinas illustrates is acknowledged, it
becomes clear that the distinctions between humanity and animality, upon which
both Kant and rIcidcgger insist, need not be denied or transcended- but neither
need they entail excluding non-human animals from the realm of direct ethical
relevance. 1nstead, these distinctions can become the source for the explicit and
radical inclusion of non-human animals in the ethical inner circle, as humans are
led to extend human "civility" to the non-human animal world.
One other Lcvinasian theme deserving attention is that of "the face," which
proves extraordinarily fruitful in explaining both the connections between humans and other anima ls and the difference between all animals (humans included)
and "things." T his image, crucial for Lcvinas, is perhaps even more important for
the project of this paper. 1,ikc.: language between humans- the privileged medium
for ethical discourse, strongly venerated by Lcvinas-thc biological face is not
necessa rily a requirement for ethical obligation, but it is usually a sufficient mark
of it, possessed by humanity and by most non-human animals, though absent in
plants or most "mere.: things." The face is a window through which contact and
exchange of meaning (though perhaps never stable and controllable exchange)
can occur; it indicates the possibility of relations hip with another subjective being.
Jll ustrative of this, humans inscribe faces on inanimate objects to facilitate meta-
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rel evant realm, f Tcidcggcr's appro bation of human Dasein's language as the ultimate house of being, and Levinas's privileging o f the human face, could all be
considered guil ty of an o ntological imperialism that suppresses non-human ani~al alteri ty. ~go~ of this paper is to challenge the prevailing dichotomies regarding the relat1onsh1p between " civil" humanity and the "animal" world, and a g reat
deal of what Levinas writes is clearly useful in such a project. Prior to certain general determ inations about animal s as sentient like humans or, unlike hu mans, as
no n-rational, non-linguistic, or no n-handed, there is the presence of the animal's
ind ividual subjectivity, which is fo rever essentially unknowable, yet still accessible
to some degree through non-linguistic phenomenological channels. With many
fo rms of animal being we arc presented with precisely the type o f radical alterity
Levinas describes: manifestly present, yet at least partially inheren tly inaccessible
to any rational operation o ne might take. The asymmetrical structure of the relationship l ,evinas stresses is obviously in place in the human-nonhuman animal encounter. T hough Lcvinas docs not acknowledge such direct connections, potent
seeds for a rethinking of animal ethics (and animal o ntology) lie scattered
throughout his writings. Once the necessary structural asymmetry of the ethical
relationsh ip that Levinas illustrates is recognized, it becomes clear that the distinctions between humanity and animality upon which Kant, I Ieideggcr, and Levinas
insist, while not denied, no longer serve as reason to exclude no n-human animals
from the realm of direct ethical relevance. Rather, they become the source for
their explicit a nd radical inclusion. T his approach allows the immediate recognitio n of ethical demands placed on us by the paradigmatic manifestations of the
alterity that J,evinas's admittedly "humanistic" project helps o ne to rccognizemani fcstations that arc embodied in non-huma n animal forms, which are powerless in their subjection to the worlds, if any, that human civilizatio n forms for
them and allows them to have.

phorical or pseudo-subjective relationships with them. The protago nist in a recent
major Hollywood film paints a bloody face o n a volleyball, thereby tra nsforming it
from lifeless " object" into beloved co mpanio n, whose loss the castaway ea rnestly
grieves. The applicatio n of the pseudo-face ena bles this metaphorical subjective
relationship, facilitating o ne's "suspensio n of disbelief," because the natural face
usually marks a site o f subjective expressio n and mea ningful exchange.
While Lcvinas's ethical philosophy supplements the dearth o f direct ethical
statements in H eidegger, it is itself limited and in need of supplementation.
Abundant critics declare that Levinas's characterizatio ns pretermit direct, "firsttier" relationships with po tential O thers -the feminine Other is the most widely
cited example (see, e.g., the wo rk o f Critchley, Chanter , Gottlieb, Gould, Katz,
Manning, and McDonald). More relevant to the project o f this pape r, D errida
("Violence"), Benso, and o thers have leveled the specific charge of humanism
against Lcvinas, and indeed, mimicking Kant's explicit exclusionary gesture,
Levinas clearly denies that it is appro priate to apply his "ethics of alte rity" directly
to no n-human animals. When questioned poin tedly abo ut the ethical status of
no n-human a nimals in an interview, included in the compilation Re-Readi11g Ltui11ru
under the title, "The Paradox o f Mo rality," Levinas resists the idea that a nimals
have an "ethical face," arguing that in contrast to his conceptuali:mtio n C>f the
ethical pheno menon of the human face, the animal face is merely " biological"- it
docs no t invite o r co mmand a direct ethical respo nse as the face of the othe r human docs. In Totality a11d I11ji11ity, Levinas describes the primary ethical relatio nship
as that of " man-to-man" (79), and elsewhe re he locates the genesis of his tho ug ht
in the "strange relatio n to o ther h11111011I' (Co11uersolio11s 57-58). Like Ka nt, Levinas
condemns animal cruelty, but th e firm line between othe r humans as directl y ethically relevant and other animals as not directly ethically relevant re mains. J\ lso like
K ant, Lcvinas grounds this distinction in the concept of reaso n, tho ug h he
switches the terms, arguing that primary ethics entails solely in ter-huma n relation s, because humans arc th e uniquel y "1111reaso nable" creatures capable of ethical tho ug ht, which is emine ntly " irratio nal," according to Levinas, because o f the
paradoxical power structure described above. Lcvinas's exclusio n of the eminently
" reasonable" non-human animal who lives acco rding to natu ral law fro m the first
tier of ethical relevance, occupied exclusively by " unreasonable" humanity, de fies
his more fundamental reverence for o therness and his affi rmatio n of an asymmetrical ethical relationship. Challengi ng the sufficiency and/ or necessity of similarity and symmetry in the ethical relatio nship, as Levinas ve hemently urges,
requires re-thinking the uncivil exclusio n of no n-human animals fro m th e sphere
of the directly ethically relevant, irrespective o f quality or quantity o f reason.
Lcvinas' laudable insistence on the ethical importance o f o the r huma ns leads to
his unfortunate assertion that it is 011/y humani ty to which his admo nitio ns full y
pertain. This " humanism" requires supplementatio n by the anti-huma nistic ideas
of I Jeidcgger, discussed above, while Levinas's tendency to privilege human la nguage as the ultimate medium of direct ethical discourse will benefit fro m ideas
bound up with Derrida's concept of " deconstructio n," discussed below.s
Bentham's assimilation of animals within the sphere o f the lmerelyl sentient,
Kant's conscription of the animal to th e non-ratio nal and only indirectly ethicall y

To this point, we have JTeidegger contributing a phenomenological way of
thin king beyond the limitations of modern metaphysical humanism and laying the
groundwork for a concept of stewardship that f Ieidcgger does no t elaborate but
that is crucial to the project of this paper, while Levinas provides the insistence o n
the primacy of ethics and the relationship with the other person, though his contribu tion is li mited because for Lcvinas it is 011/y o ther human beings who qualify
for fi rst-tier consideration. Benso sketches a chiasmus of H eidegger and Lcvinas
in th is way, describing an "ethics of things" that extends to inanimate objects the
same direct consideration usually reserved for other humans. H erc I introduce the
wo rk of D errida to endorse, contrary to Benso (and some " deep ecologis ts"), retaining the distinction between direct and indirect duties but shifting it fro m the
boundary between human and non-human to the boundary between the animal
and the inanimate. Toward this end, D er rida's work helps to establish a link between the anti-humanistic tendencies o f H eidegger and the insistence o n the primacy of ethics as the asymmetrical encounter with altcrity that Levinas provides,
while avoiding both Heidegger's alleged ethical obscurity and Levinas's explicit
huma nism. D errida's ideas supplement those o f fleidegger and Lcvinas, support-
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ing or extending root assumptions of both thinkers' projects while indicating
places where their discourses arc vulnerable to their own critiques.
For Derrida, the ideas of I Jcidcggcr and Lcvinas arc cschatological in their attempts to make contact with absolute alterity or to transcend, via language, a humanistic horizon. Derrida questions any claim to transcend a humanistic or
anthropocentric frame of mind, arguing that reliance on language "ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground," re-establishing one "more naively
and more strictly than ever" inside the realm one purports to transcend (Margi11s
135). Derrida insists that a critique of "humanism" and "metaphysics" such as
that issued by I Tcidegger can only come from within that very tradition and using
tools it provides (Bennington 303-309).
Derrida treats 1,evinas's approach similarly in "Violence and Metaphysics,"
which is both a defense of I Jc id egger in the face of Lcvinas's attacks and a critique of Levinas's formulation of absolute altcrity. For Derrida, description of an
encounter with truly absolute alterity is a practical impossibility, for one cannot
describe that which one can by definition have no comprehension-there must be
some similarity for a self to recognize an other as existing at all (Bernasconi 128131). As with his critique of f feidcgger, Derrida's point is that Lcvinas's description of absolute alterity requires that he employ the ontological language that he
seeks to transcend, and thus that any contact with the other must involve some
mutual affectedness (ll'/riti11g 151). This points toward the middle ground between
the various dichotomies discussed in this paper.
Derrida's writings on ethics display both his distance from the strands of
thought Kant and Bentham represent and his proximity to l Icideggcr and
Lcvinas. But unlike his postmodern peers, Derrida speaks more directly to questions regarding the ethical relationship between humans and other animals, finding problematically " humanistic" clements within both I leidegger who eschewed
humanism, and Levinas, who built a philosophy around the concept. Derrida
questions the metaphysical presuppositions behind 1lcideggcr's treatment of the
ape in lrhat is Co/ltd Thi11ki11g?, applying his dcconstructive method to I Tcidcgger's
absolute opposition between human and non-human animals, which, like every
opposition (according to Derrida), "effaces I· . ·I differences and leads back l· . .) to
the homogenous" ("Geschlecht Tl" 174).
Derrida issues the same sort of critique against Levinas, arguing that Levinas
founds his ethics upon a notion of discourse as human language such that only
the one species capable of speech is considered directly ethically relevant
(Critchley 177-182). Derrida also discusses the tendency of the community to
band together while excl uding the other (Caputo 64), and this critique is easily appJjed to Lcvinas's huma nism, which was perhaps necessary in the post-Auschwitz
context and is admirab le for its attention to and respect for human altcrity, but
which nonetheless falls short of a respect for the fu ll range of alterity's possible
embodiments by excluding non-human animals from the ethical inner circle and
failing to acknowledge animali ty's non-reciprocal appeal for human civility.
To round out Derrida's contribution, three themes in his later writings provide the final key to the vision of the human-non-human animal relationship that
this paper promotes: friendship, justice, and the gift. Derrida writes of "a friend-
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ship. :'ithout presen~e,. without resemblance, without affinity, without analogy"
(Pohtus 154-155). This 1dea of friendship that he describes is in some ways more
appropriately applicable to the relationship between humans and non-human animals than it is to the inter-human encounter, for the non-human animal friend
lacks the resemblances, affinities, and analogies (shared verbal/linguistic capacities, rationality, etc.) that are at least latent in inter-human discourse. This is linked
with Derrida's supplementation of the traditional contractual notion of justicedeontological or utilitarian-with an "infinite idea of justice, infinite because irreducible, [. ...] before any contract [....]" ("Force" 965). As Kearney writes, this
means "justice is the idea of a gift without exchange, of a relation to the other
that is utterly irreducible to the normal rules of circulation, gratitude, recognition,
or symmetry" (18-50).
While Derrida's work is important for inter-human ethics as a supplement to
different versions of contractual ethics such as those elaborated in works &om
Kant's Gro1111d111ork lo tht 1'1etapf?ysic of Morals to John Rawls's A Theory of ]11stice, the
non-contractual ethical encounter he describes is even more obviously apparent in
the human-animal relationship, in which the Other is i11capable of ever reciprocating in the usual sense. Similarly, in 'Y\t this very moment in this work here I am,"
Derrida explores an idea of "radical ingratitude," arguing that the perseverance of
the true ethical relationship requires that the recipient of the "gift" not show gratitude, for to do so would nullify the Other's transcendence and return the gift to
the mundane economy of the same. Even more than most human others, with
whom soflle kind of contract is usually possible--even if it is only the simple exchange of help for thanks-non-human animals lack the power of language as we
know it and are therefore incapable of expressing gratitude in familiar ways. To
extend the courtesies of civility to them requires acknowledgement of the asymmetrical structure connecting the community of human civilization with its nonhuman animal others.

The Future Engagement of Civility and Animality in The
Postmodern Condition
The implications of all this for our relationship with non-human animals and
for ethical humanism from Kant to Levinas, seem obvious. It is not necessary to
escape human subjectivity in order to recognize direct ethical relationships between humans and other animals. Also, one can acknowledge the vast powers that
only human animals enjoy without thereby establishing a two-tiered ethical view in
which beings capable of rational reflection or verbal/linguistic signification are
valued directly, while beings that inhabit different U111welts and are immersed in
bioscmiotics arc bestowed only instrumental ethical relevance. Rather, the ontological djfferencc, including the fact that we posses cognitive abilities far beyond
animal capacity (and therefore powers for good or evil beyond any animal's capacity)-employed by Kant as the grounds for excluding animals from the realm of
the directly ethically relevant noted but discarded as ethically irrelevant by
Bentham painstakingly elucidated by Heidegger and maintained in Kantian fashion by Levinas- becomes the basis for the most direct ethical consideration of
these animal others. The asymmetry of tl1e relationship can be recognized as the
wellspring of our obligation toward them.
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H owever, even in Derrida's writings, the relationship between humans and
o ther animals is usually employed as an example to illustrate a general principle
but is not investigated thoroughly as a subject replete with its own unique questio ns. While in numerous places Derrida uses the conceptual division between human and a nimal to exemplify precisely the type of ontological distinction that
deconstruction deconstructs, discourse regarding the practical treatment of nonhuman animals is rare in Derrida's corpus. When it comes to specific and concrete
questions abo ut the ethical status of non-human animals, even Derrida's thought
risks falling into "anthropologocentrism." During a conference during the summer of 1993 Derrida is said to have remarked, "I am a vegetarian in my soul"
'
(Steeves 32). O ne wonders, given this formulation, whether Derrida intends to
distinguish between "vegetarian in soul" (i.e., thinking deconstruction) and "vegetarian in body" (specificall y "appl ying" deconstruction), and whether one can be
the for mer but not the latter without fall ing short of the ethical demands that
deconstructio n makes. If Derrida docs intend such a distinction, it is unc lear how
this harmo nizes with his usual method of dcconstructing such dichotomiett
Regardless of w hether or no t Derrida cats factory-fa rmed chicken, one can,
by transforming and extend ing lines of thought that he, r Tcidcgger, and Levinas
establish, ad vance a radical approach to questions regarding animals' ethical status
along the lines of the "radical hermeneutics" advocated by Caputo, which "consists not in fi nding meaning but in dealing with the breakdown of meaning, the
shattering and fou ndering of meaning' (279). The human-animal relationship
well exemplifies the eth ical structu re that postmodcrnism identifies, but the practical demands that this relationship entails have yet to be fu ll y recognized, and further analysis o f postmodern ethical themes and their application to the
human-animal relationship is emine ntly ti mely. Such re-th inking can facilitate expanding the community of beings deser ving civili ty to incl ude even those nonhuman a nimal beings amo ng who m, o ne might argue, incivil ity reigns. Th is paper
is but o ne tiny part of the vast effort to help "civilization" evolve by reaching back
towards a near-obsolete sense of "civility" that involves connotations of kind ness,
gentleness, and h111na11eness. It looks forward to days w hen humans will more pervasively apply the values wrapped up in this archaic sense of civility in their interactio n with th e o th er animals wh ose worlds they shape.

Notes
1. The Oxford E nglish Dictionary lists twenty senses, many with subdivisions, of the
word "civil." Mos t indicate relatio ns between me mbers of the citizenry, or community, and deal exclusively with human discourses o n society, poli tics, and
" civil" e thics, with conno tatio ns o f citizenship and urbanencss. This paper
loo ks to the eleventh definition o n the list- a definition marked as o bsolete by
the dictio nary's edito rs-as the key to appropriately understanding the ethical
. il" as " Irn. Is: thc sense o f " ctv
relatio nship between humans and o t her amma
mane, gentle, kind" (255).
2. For a contrary view, in which no n-human bu t no n-do mesticated animal li fe in
urba n centers is the foc us, sec the work o f rfuw G riffi ths, Ing rid Po ul ter, an<l
D avid Sibley (56-71) and Jenni fe r Wolch, Alec Brownl ow, and Unna Lassiter
(7 1-98).
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3. Alelheia is a Greek term, which Heidegger renders into German as
"Entbergen," and which EngLish translators have rendered as "revealing" or
"unconccalment."
4. I borrow a notion from Being a11d Time here, which is, admittedly, an exposition
of specifically human being. As with my treatment of Levinas, I would argue
that this notion of I Ieideggec>s has applicability beyond the realm in which the
author originally inscribed it.

5. This assumption of the ethical primacy of human verbal language as the first
and best link between the self and the other, without acknowledgement that different links might exist between other beings, pervades two of his major works,
Tolaliry and !Jifi11iry and Othenvise Ihm Being. Bringing ideas from the field of
"biosemiorics" into the discussion would facilitate the notion of communication beyond the human verbal and linguistic forms-see e.g., Jacob von
Uexkull's notion of the Um111elt, which helps one understand animal being in
ways commensurate with but not identical to human being.
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